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SIEV X and the Banality of Evil: An 
Interview with Tony Kevin
Interviewer: Anthony Ashbolt
[Tony Kevin is the author of the award-winning A Certain 
Maritime Incident: The Sinking of the SIEV X, published 
in 2004.1 He retired from the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1998, after a thirty-year 
public service career involving posts in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Prime 
Minister’s Department. He was previously Australia’s 
ambassador to Poland (1991-94) and Cambodia (1994-
97). Tony Kevin has been an honorary Visiting Fellow 
at the Australian National University Research School 
of Pacific and Asian Studies since 1998. Since 2001 he 
has given guest classes on United Nations peacekeeping 
at Melbourne University Institute of Asian Languages 
and Societies, and since 2004 has given tutorials at 
the University of Wollongong on the role of diplomacy 
in International Relations. Since February 2002, Tony 
Kevin has been assisting in the public investigation of the 
sinking south of Java on 19 October 2001 of the asylum-
seeker boat that took 353 lives, referred to as SIEV X 
(Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel, Unknown). Tony Kevin 
testified at the Senate hearings into SIEV X and SIEV 4 
(The Children Overboard Affair) in March and April 2002 
and has written numerous articles for Eureka Street, 
Canberra Times, Melbourne Age, Sydney Morning Herald, 
The Australian, and The Australian Financial Review. 
He has been awarded the “International Whistleblower 
of the Year” by the prestigious London-based “Index on 
Censorship” non-governmental organisation in March 
2003, and a “Just Australian of the Year 2003” award by 
the “A Just Australia” organisation in July 2003.2]
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AA: First of all, I think we need to outline the details of the SIEV 
X tragedy, background and context, and the questions it 
posed for you about Australian politics. 
TK: The context was of course the announced Operation 
Relex, which was a major military operation in the high 
seas north of Christmas Island and Ashmore Reef in the 
waters between those two Australian island territories and 
Indonesia, to combat a sudden upsurge over the previous 
two years, 1989 and 1990 and the first half of 1991, in the 
flow of large numbers of Middle Eastern-origin refugees 
seeking asylum in Australia. Just to give the figures on 
this, in 1998 you had something like 900, which was 
already quite an increase on the year before. In 1999 and 
2000 you had something like 4000 a year. In 2001 you 
would have had 4000 had it not been for Operation Relex 
which sent back about 600, on four boats sent back to 
Indonesian waters, and transferred to Nauru or Manus 
Island about another 900. So you still have very large 
numbers coming down. SIEV X was the sort of traumatic 
event on the 19th of October 2001, which sent such shock 
waves around the world because of the scale of human 
loss (353 people—146 children, and 142 women) that it 
sort of shocked Indonesia into stopping doing whatever it 
might have been doing to allow this trade to continue. And 
it also shocked Indonesia into agreeing to an Australian 
demand to co-host a regional conference against people 
smuggling. And it also, very importantly, was the catalyst 
for Indonesia to accept a policy of tow-back by Australian 
boats—to be able to tow back to Indonesian waters boats—
any boats—that the Australian defence force discovered in 
the areas approaching Christmas island or Ashmore Reef. 
So it was a seminal event, a tragic event of course, an 
event that Australians found very difficult to own and still 
find very difficult to own. 
AA: Why do you think that is? 
TK: Because the questions raised by it are too disturbing 
to bear thinking about. We have an announced border 
protection operation, a massive operation involving two of 
Australia’s largest ships—our frigates which were shortly 
due to go to the Persian Gulf—lots of smaller boats as 
well, an Australian Orion maritime surveillance squadron 
operating from Western Australia and unknown capacities 
in the area of JORN over the-horizon radar, all dedicated 
to seeing boats on their way to Christmas Island or 
Ashmore Reef, and yet unaccountably this particular boat 
got sixty miles out into the Indian Ocean, south of the 
Sunda Strait, and according to the official Australian story 
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was undetected.3 Now that in itself is hard to believe. It 
becomes even harder to believe when you see the extent of 
the circulation of Asian cover-up and down right lying that 
took place during the Senate Committee into A Certain 
Maritime Incident,4 which had hearings throughout the 
Winter of 2002, and not only went into detail into the 
whole SIEV 4 incident, the so called Children Overboard, 
but also at my request went into SIEV X. What really came 
home to me after writing my book, and after seeing the 
way in which my book was received or ignored, for the 
most part ignored by official circles, is that really this is a 
very disturbing and discomforting story and one that our 
official circles really don’t want to know about. 
AA: Even the title of your book, and of course of the enquiry 
as you refer to it—was that the official title, A Certain 
Maritime Incident?
TK: Yes. 
AA: There’s something Orwellian about that, isn’t there?
TK: Well, of course the title referred to the famous incident of 
the photographs of the children in the water and how they 
got there, whether they were thrown by their parents, or 
whether as it turned out later to be the truth, they were 
there as the result of the particularly ruthless Australian 
strategy of keeping them on their boat after it had been 
taken in tow as a disabled boat, of keeping them on board 
their boat until it actually sank thereby forcing them to 
jump into the water. What this was about, we don’t still 
really know. We don’t know whether it was a determination 
to make them suffer, which was one possible explanation, 
make them appreciate the risks that they were running 
to create deterrence against others, in other words, or 
whether it was a legal argument that once they were 
brought on board HMAS Adelaide Australian obligations 
were engaged, rescue at sea obligations ... Well, if that 
were the case, they certainly weren’t honoured because 
when they were brought on board HMAS Adelaide they 
were transferred onto another ship and taken to Nauru. 
So why they couldn’t have been brought on board HMAS 
Adelaide twenty-two hours earlier, when they were taken 
into tow rather than left on a sinking boat, is something 
that still puzzles me. I called my book A Certain Maritime 
Incident even though it was about the sinking of the SIEV 
X, not about that particular maritime incident, because as 
you say it conveys the sort of bland, impersonal cruelty of 
the whole context in which SIEV X sank, and my publisher 
and I thought it was an appropriate title. 
AA: Indeed. Before we get onto the whole question of government 
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accountability that you raise very clearly in the book, what 
sponsored your interest specifically in this incident, and 
generally in the cause of refugees? Was it something that 
was ongoing, or was it a more recent development? Does 
it go back, for example I am wondering, to your time in 
Cambodia? 
TK: I guess it hooks into my concern that people are becoming 
pawns of government policies. That States imposing their 
national sovereignty preferences as to ‘we shall decide 
who comes here and the circumstances in which they 
come’ are capable of enormous cruelty. When it comes to 
stateless people, refugees, people searching for refuge and 
the hypocrisy of it given that we were signatory to the UN 
convention and have promised to honour that convention, 
the way in which Admirals of the Australian Defence Force 
said quite clearly it was of no interest to us whether they 
were claiming to be refugees or not, our job was to turn 
them around, to deter them, to send them away. I felt we 
were getting into very morally dubious territory here, the 
territory of the banality of evil. Evil things were being done 
to these people. Our defence force shouldn’t be doing evil 
things. I, as a patriotic Australian, don’t like that, and I 
felt it needed to be exposed.
AA: Yes, but is it something, if you had still been a government 
official, you would have taken on board, or would it have 
just been put in the side cupboard, as it were? 
TK: I hope it would have been taken on board. I don’t think 
I would have sufficiently put my conscience to sleep to 
let that one get through. I have to admit that I worked 
for thirty years in government and things did go through, 
but in retrospect I wonder what was I doing when that 
was happening. I think I was one of those lucky public 
servants who happened not to be working on particular 
desks where particularly nasty things were happening. 
So, for instance, I never worked on the Cambodia desk 
before I went to Cambodia as Ambassador, so I missed 
out on that whole period in which Cambodia was basically 
victimised, made a pariah state, throughout the 1980s, 
nor did I work on the Vietnam desk during the Vietnam 
War, for example. In a way I was lucky. I didn’t face any of 
those moral choices during my thirty years of professional 
work.
AA: Onto that question of government accountability, 
particularly in our system where we are still meant to 
retain some sort of Westminster system of accountability. 
In our political system, of course, it is meant to be much 
more important than the system of checks and balances 
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and it is open to argument as to which is more democratic. 
At least under the Westminster system of a chain of 
accountability you have links in that chain. What you’ve 
been able to identify is those links disappearing and the 
chain no longer exists in a sense, and so you have grave 
problems for democracy. Is that one of the fundamentals 
things that you uncovered in your research about SIEV 
X? 
TK: Yes, not just SIEV X but SIEV 4 as well, the boat intercepted 
by HMAS Adelaide about which one can say more things 
more definitely because so much more concrete evidence 
actually came out about what happened. 
AA: Could you detail that then? 
TK: SIEV 4 started off being an argument over whether 
photographs were being misrepresented as being 
something that they were not, parents throwing their kids 
into the sea in order to put unacceptable moral pressure 
on Australia. That was all a lie. But the really important 
thing about SIEV 4 was that when Australia’s rescue at sea 
obligations were engaged, they were abused. The Captain 
of the Adelaide reported that SIEV 4 was unseaworthy and 
he was, as is his responsibility as a mariner, taking it in 
tow, and did he have permission to bring the people on 
board the Adelaide? The minute he was told ‘No, you do 
not have permission to bring them on board, keep them on 
their boat,’ the law of rescue at sea was being violated and 
everybody in the command chain from the Prime Minister 
down to him was violating that sacred obligation and as he 
just rightly said something went wrong in the command 
chain because nobody at any point said ‘Hey, this is not 
only wrong but its also against the law. What are we doing 
here?’ That fact didn’t seem to engage anybody until a 
couple of Senators, Senator Jacinta Collins and Senator 
Andrew Bartlett, quizzed this point very, very thoroughly 
and it emerged that the Committee headed by Jane Halton, 
The People Smuggling Task Force, had been the conduit 
for a political view coming down—keep these people on 
their boat whatever happens. And that is the real story of 
the Children Overboard incident, that 200 people’s lives 
were put at risk for twenty-two hours under the noses of 
a major Australian navy ship and nobody involved in the 
command chain said this is wrong. 
AA: Is it stupidity, intransigence, banality of evil. What is it? 
TK: It is certainly the banality of evil. I think it’s fear, and the 
habit of obedience that whatever order comes down has to 
be obeyed, whatever it says. 
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AA: In that context, is this government more blameworthy 
for that sort of culture of obedience than any previous 
Australian government you can identify, or can you see it 
building up in previous governments? 
TK: I can certainly see it building up. Some of the legislation 
that was passed under the late Hawke and Keating 
governments to do with refugee treatment was certainly 
laying the groundwork for this. And just to make a little 
personal anecdote here, I find it very curious that someone 
who struck me as a perfectly normal, average sort of 
public servant who I encountered in an overseas posting, 
doing a normal sort of immigration type job, finished up 
as the head of Woomera, when some of the most terrible 
things happened at Woomera. So I think that I have direct 
experience of how people can be brutalised in a system 
and it’s very hard not to be and it probably involves career 
sacrifice not to be. It almost certainly does. 
AA: There’s a sense, which you might find as galling, that 
the current Australian Wheat Board (AWB) scandal is 
rather minor, in a sense, compared with what you have 
identified as the scandal surrounding the SIEV X, and the 
refugee question in general. Of course the AWB scandal 
highlights a tendency to seek secrecy and cover-up that 
you have pinpointed. It’s a blatant example of government 
hypocrisy, but by the same token every expert knows that 
corruption has always existed in that field of dealing with 
the Middle East. 
TK: The AWB scandal is very interesting. In fact I guess I do 
wish that SIEV X and Children Overboard, as it truly was, 
had engaged the same sort of scrutiny that AWB has. 
And of course, the very fact that AWB is being handled in 
a Commission of Inquiry, a Royal Commission with full 
judicial powers, whereas SIEV X and Children Overboard 
were only handled by Senate Committees, where basically 
public servants only have to answer the questions that 
they want to answer, is a huge fundamental difference for a 
start. But the AWB story is very interesting. And of course 
we are speaking on a day when it has been announced 
that the Prime Minister has to give a submission and may 
have to be cross-examined, so it’s reaching a climax. The 
AWB story has once again shown the Australian cultural 
tendency to shy away from unpalatable facts. Not only in 
the way in which everybody in the command chain were all 
basically pushing the problem away and pretending that 
it could be addressed on the basis of the AWB saying ‘No, 
no, we didn’t do any of those things,’ end of story. But also 
even now, and this is what disturbs me greatly, we still 
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don’t really appreciate the nature of what the allegation is. 
Our opposition parties are still talking about it in terms 
of how reprehensible it is if money was sent to Saddam 
Hussein when we were about to go to war with Saddam 
Hussein, that we were paying for the bullets that might 
have shot our soldiers. Typically, this was an ethno-centric 
Australian focused way of looking at it and nobody in the 
Australian political culture, with very few rare exceptions, 
seems to be prepared to call this what it was, which was 
stealing from starving children, stealing from sick children, 
corruptly using money that had been earmarked for much 
needed medicines and much needed foodstuffs for those 
suffering groups of innocent people in Iraq. You have got 
to search high and low in Australian media commentary 
and political commentary to find recognition of that fact. 
And yet to me that’s one of the most important facts. 
Once again it’s this capacity to close our eyes and to close 
our hearts to suffering when it involves groups of people 
who we basically don’t care a stuff about, like the Iraqi 
population. 
AA: And yet there’s a paradox here. And it’s a paradox that you 
identify in a sense, without calling it a paradox later on in 
the book, and we might talk about this in a moment, but 
here was a situation where in the lead up to war, hundreds 
of thousands came out on the streets of Australia, saying 
‘no we do not want war,’ ‘we have no justification for war’. 
The minute Australian troops were committed, somehow 
or another, that resolve disappeared and the war went 
ahead. It became revealed that we were fed lies, and we 
were told that by Andrew Wilke and others beforehand, 
and we shrugged it off. In a sense Iraq broke the back 
of Australian resistance to government power. Perhaps it 
was just the end of people saying we can stand up and 
make a difference. That’s a pessimistic reading of it. Do 
you see it that way?
TK: It’s a pessimistic reading of it but you would have to say 
on the basis of attendance at demonstrations—compared 
to numbers going along to meetings since that—massive 
demonstrations which had no effect on government, which 
Howard contemptuously dismissed as the mob. Yes, I would 
have to say that the facts support the thesis that it broke 
the back. It would certainly have been a different story 
had we taken Australian casualties in Iraq or Afghanistan, 
and in significant numbers. I think that’s what’s really 
turned it for the Americans. That fact of more than 2000 
American soldiers now killed in action. If you applied 
that sort of figure comparatively to Australia’s population 
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which is much smaller you might hypothesise that if we 
had lost say 50 dead in Iraq we’d have a very different 
story now. As usual Australian troop commanders have 
been ordered at all costs to preserve the life of their men, 
which is good of course. I think, rather like in Vietnam, 
we’re there to make a political point rather than to make a 
military contribution, and we are being kept out of harms 
way deliberately. It probably won’t happen but there 
could, for example, be a bus blown up or a truck blown 
up and there could be a largish number of casualties. I 
pray it won’t happen, of course. But it is one of the things 
that worries me about Australia, the way that we seem 
to be able to shrug off, and live with criminal activity by 
our government without it affecting us. Of course we are 
staring down the barrel of another scenario like that now 
in relation to Iran. 
AA: Yes. If my memory serves me correctly you were really 
the first one to identify the fact that our SAS forces were 
used in Iraq before they legally should have been and 
that’s another example of what you are talking about—the 
illegality.
TK: Yes, that was the ultimate illegality. Not only were we taking 
part in an illegal attack on a sovereign state that was not 
sanctioned by any Security Council resolution but we were 
also actually attacking before we said we were going to 
attack, which was if you like, the ultimate act of dishonour. 
And there again, even though I wrote an article about this, 
which appeared in the Australian Journal of International 
Affairs,5 an impeccably conservative and mainstream 
journal, there has been absolutely no feedback to that 
article. No references to it, no annotations, no footnoting, 
no response, no comment. Nothing. Just silence. 
AA: And when it comes to media commentary on the invasion 
of Iraq or things going wrong in Iraq, or whatever, it’s 
invariably former SAS officers who are dragged before the 
cameras, including ABC cameras. 
TK: Yes. I wonder at this capacity not to face unpalatable facts 
about ourselves, about our conduct in the world. Is it a 
peculiar Anglo-Saxon thing, I wonder? The British were 
like this over the Falklands, and some dreadful things 
happened in the Falklands war that are simply being 
airbrushed out of history, the way the British write it. You’d 
have to go to Argentina to see some of those accounts. 
And it’s the capacity to control the past—George Orwell 
territory again. To control the future we have to control 
the past, and the way in which it is presented. 
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AA: On the refugee question generally, this is specifically a 
question I suppose of interest to many of our readers who 
are trade union activists and members, people who care 
about jobs in the community. They are not Hansonites by 
any means, they’re more part of a left labour movement, 
but what do you say to a worker, to a trade unionist 
concerned that migrant workers, perhaps particularly, 
perhaps particularly refugees, will further undermine 
working conditions and rights in Australia, as they are 
undermined by official legislation and so on. So the worker 
might say well, yes, it’s a sad story and it’s a pity that 
they’re persecuted in their home countries but we have 
our jobs to protect. What do you say to that worker?
TK: I just say that the ethic of propinquity, if you like, that 
when a person comes and knocks on your door and 
says help me, the fact that that person is engaging you 
at the personal level takes it, and should take it, beyond 
questions of state policy. You can’t answer a fellow human 
being’s plea for help, a fellow human being in distress, by 
starting to read them a lecture on employment problems 
in your country. Those sort of issues become engaged, 
properly engaged, and questions like should we be having 
unskilled temporary worker programmes, should we be 
allowing a backdoor migration program through student 
education, all those sorts of policy issues become engaged 
… but once you start confusing a human cry for help at 
your door with abstract considerations of employment 
policy, you’re heading to a very unpleasant sort of political 
culture. 
AA: I should add to that that this local area and union movement, 
and organizations nationally that are represented locally 
also, like the Maritime Workers’ Union, have a very noble 
history of fighting on behalf of others. I was just asking 
you that question to confront what you do hear in certain 
sections of the community, for example ‘they are going to 
take away our jobs.’ 
TK: I would add a couple of things. I’d say that generally 
speaking Australians, even when they profess chauvinist 
or racist attitudes in general, which in various times in 
our history we have done in Australian history, when 
they encounter people face-to-face, show kindness and 
generosity. It’s very rare that racism operates in Australia 
at the face-to-face level. At the face-to-face level people are 
usually kind and decent. The second thing I would say is 
that this fear of refugees taking over jobs is full of irony. 
There was the fear of refugees taking jobs in Australian 
meat works around Australia. In fact the real risk with 
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meatworkers and meatworks around Australia is the 
Howard Industrial Relations legislation, not the presence 
of any Afghan refugees. They didn’t take any jobs away 
from any Australians, certainly last week the jobs of a 
large number of Australians in Cowra were put at risk.
AA: And will be in the future.
TK: And will be in the future. 
AA: There’s a sad moment towards the end of your book 
where you say, and we have touched on this before, while 
defending Labor’s questioning of the lapdog role of our 
public service and security system, you remark (and this 
reflects the date of publication of your book) that Labor, 
‘seems within striking distance of winning government’. 
Around the same time, you note that ‘if any government 
tries again to play the border protection card in Australian 
elections, that people will be alerted’ and again a little bit 
later, ‘I have often said that SIEV X is a test of the kind 
of country Australia wants to be.’ It seems to me that 
you see glimmers of optimism in all of those references, 
one that wasn’t borne out of course by Labor not being 
elected to office. Whereas, arguably, we can also see a 
darker soul, a cynicism about politics, a reluctance to 
depart from what Clive Hamilton calls the ‘certainties of 
material comfort’—we benefit so much from the system 
why should we care about others. And yet you still see at 
the core, a possibility of Labor as a party, or some other 
grouping, getting together that essential compassion that 
exists within Australian community. Do you see that as a 
genuine possibility?
TK: I still do. I don’t necessarily see it coming through the ALP 
as it is currently led and organised. It could come through 
Labor policy being influenced by what the minor parties 
do or what the factions within the Liberal Party do. I think 
since I wrote the book the fairly successful effort by Petro 
Georgiou and Judy Moylan’s group to humanise the worst 
excesses of the detention policy, as well as the exposure 
of the Rau and Solon Affairs, the ongoing revelations 
about the affairs of Mr X and Mr Y…since then, there’s 
no longer the same sort of in your face defiance, “we can 
do what we like to those people because nobody cares”. 
These days they do have to at least pretend to care and 
I also think that the whole story of the West Papua 42 
in the outrigger canoe is an encouraging story because 
it first of all shows that somehow or another the net did 
not stop these people reaching Australia. It would be 
really interesting to know when they were first detected 
by Australian border control, and what sorts of decisions 
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were taken as to letting them through or not letting them 
through, and who took those decisions. I’d like to know 
that. But also since they arrived here there’s been this 
clear pubic pressure, which forced the government’s 
hand I think, into accepting them for temporary residence 
status as refugees. I would have preferred that they were 
given permanent residence immediately, of course. I don’t 
know why they are left in the limbo of temporary residency 
but at least they’ve been given three years of protection. 
I think that’s the kind of hope that my book was looking 
forward to. And I hope my book contributed in a small way 
to the sensitisation of people about this issue of the rights 
of boat people. Because you see boat people are people. 
They’re not a parcel of heroin. They’re not an undesirable 
substance that can be basically burnt or discarded. They 
are human beings with the right to be treated as human 
beings. 
AA: And in that context it must have disturbed you that a great 
amount of publicity went to people who were arrested in 
Indonesia on drug charges, vis-à-vis the refugee questions 
you like to focus upon. Is this just the media’s propensity 
for scandal?
TK: I didn’t like the way in which the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP), which of course plays a major role in the SIEV X 
story, a role yet to be detailed but there is a major role 
somewhere there, I didn’t like the way they apparently 
basically set up Australians to face a possible death penalty 
in Indonesia. I thought there was a great ruthlessness and 
callousness in that. I don’t mind that we care a lot about 
people like Shapelle Corby and the Bali 9 and the other 
Australian woman, Michelle Leslie. We should care about 
them. They’re Australian citizens and they have a right to 
protection abroad and we have a right to use our national 
weight, such as it is, to try and look after our people. But 
we also need to recognise that all human beings engage in 
obligation, in humanitarian obligation, particularly when 
they come into our turf, or areas that we claim as our 
turf. I come back to Operation Relex—the minute we said 
we are going to put a cordon up there which is going to 
intercept whatever comes and send it back, and no one is 
going to get through, we were engaging in a humanitarian 
obligation, by that very statement, to protect life. And 
Howard knew this. Howard knew this, and he said from 
the very beginning, he said, we are not going to sink boats. 
And yet a boat was sunk by means as yet unknown. 
AA: On that very issue, you probably don’t want to speculate 
on that. Do you, however, have your own suspicions? 
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TK: My thinking has moved on a little bit since my book, on 
all of this. The book makes an implicit assumption that 
the wave of boat people that came down here between 
1989 and 1992 was autonomously generated, sort of an 
overflow from the Middle East, from refugee flows towards 
Europe. It was just a certain point in time, large numbers 
of people decided to try for Australia. I no longer believe 
that. I think that there’s a very real possibility, and this 
flows from looking at the way smugglers like Abu Kusay 
and many others, received so much cooperation and 
protection from Indonesian authorities. You can’t go on 
saying that they were making a lot of money and they 
corrupted the Indonesian police to protect them, it’s too 
big for that. I really wonder now whether there wasn’t a 
deliberate covert Indonesian policy after Timor to send a 
lot of people down to basically rub Australia’s nose in it. 
And if you start with that hypothesis, which is a fairly 
recent development in my thinking, it explains a lot in 
ways that perhaps my book left a little bit unexplained. 
Why was the Australian reaction so vehement? Why did 
it engage such a high level of national security attention? 
People kept saying, what does it matter, these are just few 
thousand people, Australia is big enough to absorb them 
and if you say that the Australian national security agents 
perceived an Indonesian government covert effort to flood 
Australia with Middle Eastern boat people, then it sort 
of explains the strength of the Australian reaction and 
the ruthlessness of it. But of course that goes on to my 
position that you cannot treat people as if they were little 
parcels of heroin. They are people. 
AA: Whatever the motives of the Indonesian government we 
have certain roles and responsibilities that shouldn’t be 
reactive to that? 
TK: Not in a way that damages the right to life of the people 
involved. 
AA: It’s interesting to hear you say that there might be 
all sorts of geo-political reasons and nautical reasons 
that I don’t even know about, but given the successful 
transition of a number of refugees from Australia to New 
Zealand, why don’t boats all the time go to New Zealand? 
It raises, perhaps, that sort of question. Why was it always 
Australia? So there is a bit of evidence to support that 
hypothesis. Undoubtedly along the way other things will 
come to light that will refine your particular thesis. 
TK: Two things already have. It was very interesting in the 
middle of the brouhaha over the Papua New Guinean 42 
both Hassan Wirajuda, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
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and Yudhoyono, the President, both said very clearly in 
the last two weeks, “Australia’s relied on our cooperation 
against illegal immigration over the last three years and 
they had better be careful because that cooperation may 
not be forthcoming in the future.” To me both those 
statements send very clear signals of a possible Indonesian 
covert involvement in turning on the tap and turning off 
the tap of Middle Eastern people. 
AA: Does this lead you to suggest that, as a few of your 
colleagues, and former colleagues, not necessarily close 
colleagues, but in different areas of the public service, 
have been arguing in print and elsewhere recently… that 
there’s too much strength in the Indonesian lobby within 
Foreign Affairs and the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)?
TK: Yes. There’ll always be an Indonesian lobby in government 
because governments put the highest priority on getting 
on well with other governments, particularly powerful 
neighbouring governments. The Indonesian lobby in 
DFAT and DIMIA, in the AFP, is almost structural. It will 
always be there. And it will always be the moral role of 
non-government organizations (NGOs), and human rights 
groups, and opposition parties, to point out the human 
rights consequences of that sort of thinking being given 
too much weight. There will always be a tension. I don’t 
see this ever going away because there are those that 
say we must deal with Indonesia, as it is a huge country, 
it’s the largest Muslim country in the world, it’s our next 
door neighbour. We can’t afford idealistic causes like East 
Timor and West Papua. Yet, there are those who say “No! 
We have to stand for something more than Realpolitick, we 
have to stand for decency in the way we treat people.” Now 
I am very comfortable in that latter count. For a lot of my 
career, I have to be honest and say I would have probably 
argued the other way. I’ve changed. 
AA: And that’s the adjustment from a kind of conservative 
real-politick that goes naturally with the bureaucracy, to a 
distance that affords you a necessarily more humanitarian 
perspective?
TK: Yes. I am speaking now as a citizen not as a public servant. 
I am speaking now as someone who is concerned at the 
moral worth of my country, and if Australia behaves in 
cruel and cynical ways towards people, that distresses 
me as an Australian, and so yes, it’s a very different 
perspective now. 
AA: At the time of the last election, you and a number of 
other former government officials, very high government 
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officials, former ambassadors, and so on, signed a letter 
deploring the current state of Australian politics. Has 
anything changed? 
TK: Probably not. None of the people who signed that letter, 
starting from Dick Woolcott,6 have restored positions of 
influence on the government. They are still very much on 
the outer. Of course, the letter was mainly provoked by 
the invasion of Iraq. In terms of what we were just talking 
about you can proceed either from a moral viewpoint 
or the Realpolitick viewpoint and still come to the same 
conclusion that the invasion of Iraq was a totally wrong 
and irresponsible decision. But I think a lot of the people 
who signed that letter are probably still in the Realpolitick 
mode. But we came together over those issues. We were 
merely calling for a less stupid government than the 
government that took us to war in Iraq. No, I don’t think 
that anything much as changed and I very much fear that 
there could be secret plans even now for the Australian 
government to give diplomatic, and maybe even tactical 
military support to all sorts of schemes directed against 
Iran, so it’s a very worrying time. 
AA: Do you see any coherent opposition developing in the 
federal arena or is it just falling all over the place?
TK: It’s all over the place. There are individuals who are trying 
to warn of the dangers of the current wrapping up of spin 
against Iran. I am certainly trying to warn against it but 
we are voices in the wilderness, as usual. Mainstream 
commentators don’t want to touch it and yet there’s a wealth 
of international, very high quality international analysis, 
showing the hollowness of the case for war against Iran but 
it doesn’t seem to reach Australia. There’s a great laziness 
about Australian commentators on international policy 
and strategic policy. They just basically take whatever is 
being fed to them by government spin doctors and they 
don’t do the fairly small amount of work that’s involved in 
reading the international media in a broad way to see that 
there are very different arguments on these questions. 
AA: Yes. Even to the point where Iran is synonymous with 
Arab, which of course it is not. 
TK: It would take me ten minutes on a computer to turn up a 
respectable page of Google references as to why an attack 
on Iran at this point is foolish, as well as immoral. It would 
take me ten minutes. And yet none of our so-called foreign 
policy gurus seem to bother to do that. 
AA: Hugh White is an interesting case, isn’t he? I can 
remember him being a barracker for war. Now he is kind 
of withdrawing from that position. 
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TK: He is very defensive on that point. He says that he was 
always against the war, that we went to war for the wrong 
reasons. He’s very much on the fence and so many people 
are on the fence. You don’t notice any of those people 
coming forward now saying we shouldn’t be making war 
in Iran. 
AA: No. Whereas today, Seymour Hersh has revealed Bush 
government plans to bomb Iran.7 
TK: Going back over the history of the preparations for war 
against Iraq, there was a brilliant expose in The Bulletin8 
that a very senior group of Australian ADF military 
planners went to Florida to work with Central Command 
on the invasion plans from the middle of 2002. So for 
nine months before the invasion in March 2003 we had 
Australian military planners working in Central Command 
in Florida, helping to plan the invasion. It makes me 
wonder whether something of the same kind might not 
be happening now. I would love to see somebody ask 
the question in the Senate. Can the Minister for Defence 
confirm or deny whether Australian military are currently 
engaging in contingency planning with Americans for a 
war in Iran? In fact I might suggest it. 
AA: The sad thing is the ‘I don’t know’ or ‘this is not in my 
purview,’ or whatever, works these days.
TK: Or they’d simply lie and say nothing’s happening, when 
something really is happening. 
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